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Abstract—Many public sources of cyber threat and vulner-
ability information exist to serve the defense of cyber systems.
This paper proposes BRON which is a composite of MITRE’s
ATT&CK MATRIX, NIST’s Common Weakness Enumera-
tions (CWE), Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE),
and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification,
CAPEC. BRON preserves all entries and relations while enabling
bi-directional, relational path tracing. It exploits attack patterns
to trace between the objectives and means of attacks to the
vulnerabilities and affected software and hardware configurations
they target. We inventory and analyze BRON’s sources to gauge
any gap between information on attacks and information on
attack targets. We also analyze BRON for information that is
a by-product of its mission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber threats are harmful and hard to defend against. How-
ever, multiple sources of information about potential threats
and vulnerabilities are publicly available to help. These kinds
of sources are intended to be used by cyber security specialists
and threat hunters to develop cyber defense strategies, opera-
tions and tactics. This paper takes an interest in these sources,
aiming to fuse a coherent, purposefully selected set in a way
that provides additional support and ease of use.
One source we will explore is the MITRE ATT&CK
matrix [7], [24], [23]. It abstractly describes cyber attack Tech-
niques organized across twelve sequenced cyber attack Tactics.
One Tactic is Persistence, occurring after Initial
Access and before Privilege Escalation. ATT&CK
lists T1098/004 as a Technique that achieves persistence.
This technique describes a type of enterprise account manip-
ulation through SSH authorized keys [8].
We also explore two other database sources in the NIST
National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The NVD pro-
vides information on security-related software flaws, related
product configurations, and impact metrics. Both sources –
the Common Weakness Enumerations (CWE) [11] and
Common Vulnerability Enumerations (CVE) [10]
– are built upon and fully synchronized with lists maintained
by MITRE.
The CWE enumerations are a community-developed source
of software and hardware weakness types. “Weaknesses are
flaws, faults, bugs, and other errors in software and hardware
design, architecture, code, or implementation that if left un-
addressed could result in systems, networks, and hardware
being vulnerable to attack.” [12] CWE-269: Improper
Privilege Management is an example CWE entry, i.e.
a Weakness. It is described as software that “does not properly
assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating
an unintended sphere of control for that actor” [13].
The CVE list holds publicly known cybersecurity vulnera-
bilities. In its context, a Vulnerability is defined as a “weakness
in the computational logic (e.g., code) found in software and
hardware components that, when exploited, results in a nega-
tive impact to confidentiality, integrity, or availability.” [19].
Each CVE entry, i.e. Vulnerability, contains an identifica-
tion number, a description, and at least one reference—for
publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Additional entry
information can include fix information, severity scores and
impact ratings according to the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS), and hyperlinks to external exploit and ad-
visory information [14]. CVE-2019-12183 is one example
of a CVE Vulnerability [17]. The Vulnerability description is
“Incorrect Access Control in Safescan Timemoto TM-616 and
TA-8000 series allows remote attackers to read any file via the
administrative API.” The entry’s severity score is 7.5 (High).
About half the time, a CWE entry has a relational link
to a CVE entry. For example, Weakness CWE-269 links to
CVE-2019-12183. The relationship implies that the Vulner-
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ability is an example of the (type of) Weakness. In this case
it indicates that Safescan’s TimeMoto® Intelligent Time Clock
has a vulnerability in firmware that could lead to improper
privilege management. The CVE entry provides a field with
severity score in CVSS format and Known Affected Hardware
or Software Configurations. These Affected Product Configu-
rations (or Affected Prod Conf s, our abbreviations) document
specific software or hardware releases that are affected.
Affected Product Configurations specifically are of interest,
because, with an inventory, security operators and analysts can
regularly scan them to be alerted to specific targets within their
systems.
In addition to ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques, NVD CVE
Weaknesses, NVD CWE Vulnerabilities and Affected Product
Configurations, we also explore MITRE’s Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) list. CAPEC
enumerates and classifies Attack Patterns to support identifying
and understanding attacks. An example of an Attack Pattern is
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning.
Of compelling interest are Attack Patterns that connect the
ATT&CK matrix to the CWE source. Such Attack Patterns
function as bridges that relate a Technique to a CWE entry,
i.e. Weakness, hence they tie a means of attack (serving a
specific tactical objective, i.e. Tactic) to its targeted weakness.
Since a Weakness in CWE can link to a Vulnerability in
CVE, and that entry can link to specific Known Affected
Hardware or Software Configurations, Attack Patterns with
this “end-to-end” linkage are means of connecting all the
way from a Tactic that an attacker may choose, to specific
Known Affected Hardware or Software Configurations that
could be affected. Vice versa, given some Affected Product
Configuration, these Attack Patterns make it possible to see
what Tactic and Techniques an adversary could use to target
it.
In a top-down example, a Discovery Tactic with a
Technique named System Network Configuration
Discovery links to CAPEC-309, Network Topology
Mapping which is related to Weakness CWE-200,
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an
Unauthorized Actor. For this Weakness there are 6,624
Vulnerabilities such as CVE-2018-8433, Microsoft
Graphics Component Information Disclosure
Vulnerability. CVE-2018-8433 is linked to 15
Affected Product Configurations.
Figure 1 schematically depicts our selected threat (i.e.
Tactics and Techniques) and defensive target (i.e. Weaknesses,
Vulnerabilities, and Affected Product Configurations) and At-
tack Patterns information sources and their relational linkage.
This composite set of information enables both cyber-hunting
and reactive, preventative and forensic security analysis on
strategic, operational and tactical levels.
Beyond the schematic’s abstraction, unfortunately, the
extent of the relational information in this composite set
is not reported. For example, CAPEC-142: DNS Cache
Poisoning is related to six CWE Weaknesses: (CWE-348,
-345, -349, -346, -441 and -350) according to the
CAPEC. However none of these Weaknesses are linked to a
Vulnerability and whether or not it is linked to a Technique
is unknown without full enumerative search of a different
Tactic
Technique
Attack Pattern
Weakness
Vulnerability
Affected Product
Configuration
Fig. 1: Schematic of BRON’s graph of the combined sources.
Source and list entries are nodes and relational links are edges.
In the original source most types of links are uni-directional.
The graph facilitates search in the opposite direction of the
source links.
information source. To date, these sources have never been
aggregated nor holistically examined.
Essentially, ATT&CK tells us the tactics and techniques
that attackers could inflict upon a vulnerable system. The
CWE, CVE and Affected Product Configurations inform us
as to where those weaknesses and vulnerabilities exist in a
system. Attack patterns link potential attack actions to weak-
nesses that would become attack targets. While it is possible to
span sources, tracing paths in some directions can be improved
to require less exhaustive efforts.
For these reasons, we present BRON. BRON follows the
schematic (see Figure 1) and combines the entry data from
these sources, preserving their internal and external linkages.
It uses a graph to represent the unified data. Each layer of
the graph denotes a different source. It is possible to traverse
the graph from abstract Tactics all the way down to concrete
Affected Product Configurations by following BRON’s bi-
directional paths. One can start from ATT&CK Tactics, find
their Techniques, then cross information sources via CAPEC
Attack Pattern linkage, to Weaknesses then Vulnerabilities and
Affected Product Configurations. Nodes within a layer are
entries from the source. For example, the second top-most
layer has all Techniques, and the second from the bottom has
Vulnerabilities. Edges in the graph correspond to relational
links between entries from different sources.
While these links are not bi-directional in the sources, they
can be traversed bi-directionally in BRON’s graph. This makes
it easy to trace back the relational connections among the
sources, when, in their original form, this cross-referencing
is not supported. BRON offers a more coherent access point
to new data consumers of these sources. It lowers the entry bar
for performing cross-referenced analyses and enables analysts
to think more contextually about attacks and vulnerabilities.
We have open-sourced BRON1 and with example data
analyses. They inventory BRON and showcase how it can be
used to explore the complex information within its sources.
In this paper we present these analyses and also demonstrates
BRON’s investigative power. Our efforts offer both the elu-
1https://github.com/ALFA-Group/BRON
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cidation of these high-value information sources and their
relationships, and conceptual and operational convenience.
The contributions of this paper are:
• BRON: a graph that stores and unifies an explicit set of
security information sources while preserving the inter
and intra relationships of their entries. BRON offers
convenience and coherence.
• An inventory of BRON that reveals the extent of the
public sources and their inter-relationships.
• A preliminary demonstration of BRON’s ability to sup-
port exploration of the information.
• Open source of BRON and our analyses.
Section II describes the sources more formally, how we as-
sembled the graph, and how we use it for analyses. Section III
describes our analyses. Section IV situates BRON within
related sources. Section V concludes with BRON’s concept,
the outcome of our analyses and summarizes BRON’s key
purpose. Finally, Section VI presents future work.
II. DATA AND IMPLEMENTATION
We present the information sources BRON combines in
Table I. There is documentation available for all sources online,
see [7], [9], [11], [10], [16].
1) BRON Implementation Overview: BRON is imple-
mented as a relational graph which represents the entries of
its different information sources as specific types of nodes and
their internal and external linkages as edges. Links that are
unidirectional in the sources are tagged as such and represented
bi-directionally in BRON’s graph. A BRON graph node has
properties which are the (verbatim) information on the specific
entry. Node properties have been standardized across the
different entry types for ease of analysis and extension, e.g. we
maintain the CPE notation for Affected Product Configuration.
To reference BRON’s information is to therefore query a
graph. For example, to quantify relationships, we trace edges
and count them and/or nodes. Since it uses a bi-directional
graph, BRON offers path finding all the way from abstract
attacker tactical goals, such as Persistence, down to the
specific applications that can be targeted as part of an attack, or
vice versa. This can be done with its information sources “in
the wild”, but less conveniently. BRON essentially eliminates
the need for enumerative search needed to invert a directional
link. BRON offers direct searching capability originating from
any node. and makes it possible to traverse along any edge
relation, starting and ending from any two entries of different
sources.
2) Analysis data: We use BRON to collect products of a
vendor by parsing the CPE notation for Affected Product Con-
figurations which includes the vendor, product, and version.
The data for Figure 12 are extracted by finding the number
of products of each vendor that are vulnerable to each Tactic.
We find the set of Tactics reachable by any version of each
product of a vendor via path tracing. If multiple versions of a
product are affected by the same Tactic, that product is counted
only once for that Tactic. Similarly, the data for Figure 18 are
extracted by finding the number of versions of each vendor
product that are vulnerable to each Tactic. We find the set of
Tactics reachable by each version of a vendor product via path
tracing.
The data for Figure 13a are extracted by finding the severity
scores of products of each vendor. Products are referenced
within Vulnerabilities which also have severity scores. Since a
product may link to multiple Vulnerabilities with each Vulner-
ability having its own severity score, we take the maximum
severity score among the product’s set of Vulnerabilities as that
product’s severity score. We plot the distribution of severity
scores for products of each vendor. Similarly, the data for Fig-
ure 13b are extracted by finding the severiy scores of products
of each vendor that are exposed to the Tactics of Discovery
and Defense Evasion. We find the subset of products of
each vendor that is reachable by the specific Tactic via path
tracing. For that subset of products, we take the maximum
severity scores of Vulnerabilities linked to each product as that
product’s severity score. We plot the distribution of severity
scores for products of each vendor reachable by the Tactics
of Discovery and Defense Evasion. The data for Figure 16
are extracted by using all severity scores of all Vulnerabilities
linked to each vendor product.
III. ANALYSES
We used the data available from the information sources
in Table I as of March 2020 and updated only the CVE
data as of June 2020 to populate BRON. All code and data
for the analysis are available in Python with tutorials in
Jupyter notebooks. Our analyses are organized by different
lenses. In Subsection III-A, we inventory BRON’s entries and
relations. In Subsection III-B, we describe the paths from
Vulnerabilities. In Subsection III-C, we use BRON to analyze
vulnerability severity. In Subsection III-D, we investigate the
paths. In Subsection III-E, we explore some example queries.
In Subsection III-F, we consider a set of vendors and count
the number of Techniques (per Tactic) that target their prod-
ucts. In Subsection III-G, we examine the severity scores for
some vendors. Finally, we apply a specific product lens (web
browsers) for Tactic analysis in Subsection III-H.
A. Entry and Relational Analyses
Our first set of analyses determine the breadth and depth of
the entries and relations within BRON. This involves counting
BRON’s nodes and edges by type using different filters. The
analyses are at different resolutions. First, we look at BRON
in the aggregate, followed by considering each source (a.k.a.
entry type). Finally, we consider severity scores.
1) Aggregate Entry and Relational Analysis: We start by
aggregating the number of entries by information source and
investigating of the relational connectivity between them. By
source, we visualize how many entries are connected in
Figure 2. We observe what we call “Floating Entries”, i.e.
entries that are isolated or “orphaned”. Only a small fraction
of Techniques are Floating Entries (1 of 266). By definition,
no Weaknesses or Affected Product Configurations are Floating
Entries. There are however two obvious sets of Floating
Entries. Of the 71, 715 Vulnerabilities, 28% are floating entries.
Of the 519 Attack Patterns, 25% are Floating Entries. This
draws attention to a level of incompletion within BRON.
However, BRON’s sources are constantly being updated and
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TABLE I: BRON information sources and types, organization and short descriptions.
Source and Type of Entry Organization Description
ATT&CK Tactics [7] MITRE 12 common tactics of attack staging. The columns of the ATT&CK matrix.
ATT&CK Techniques [7] MITRE Means of achieving a tactical objective, organized by Tactic, the row elements
of the ATT&CK matrix. In BRON, a Technique is a child of a Tactic.
CAPEC Attack Patterns [9] MITRE A naming of a relational concept linking to a Technique (parent) and/or Weakness
(child). Relates to abstract how and why (Tactic and Technique) of an attack
objective and/or to abstract “where” (Weakness) target of the attack.
NVD CWE Common Weakness Enumeration [11] NIST Security-related flaws in architecture, design, or code.
NVD CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [10] NIST Security-related flaws in software and applications.
NVD CVE entry field: Known Affected Hardware or Software Configuration NIST Specific software application or hardware platform releases that are affected,
given a parent Vulnerability. Abbreviated herein as Affected Product Configura-
tion. We follow the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) naming specification
for Affected Product Configurations [16] that is used in this field.
NVD CVE entry field: Severity score [4] NIST Severity is scored using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
The higher the score, the greater the impact of a Vulnerability. CVSS scores
range from 0 to 10.
Tactic 12
Technique 1 195 70
Attack Pattern 128 14 52 325
Weakness 142 100 72
Vulnerability 20,383 25,496 23,980 1,856
Affected Product
Configuration 16,941
Fig. 2: Visualization of BRON with Vulnerabilities from
2015-2020 and only the latest version of Affected Product
Configurations.
that Techniques are a more recent source of information. A
valid question is whether it will ever be possible to keep up.
Figure 2 also show Super Entries which equate to specific
entries that are the destination and/or source of many relational
cross-references, i.e. nodes with many edges. We expect Super
Entries given that there are many more Vulnerabilities and
Affected Product Configurations than other entry types. These
naturally will be more densely inter-connected. We find that
many Affected Product Configurations are different versions
of the same software product. Depending on how long a
Vulnerability has been latent, many historical versions of the
software may be affected when it is identified. For example, a
vulnerability in Windows 10 may extend to all prior versions
of Windows. BRON presently compiles Vulnerability data
dating back to 1999 so this could explain Super Entries. We
therefore filtered out Affected Product Configurations that were
not the most recent version of a software product and examined
how this changed the quantities of relational connections
between Vulnerabilities and Affected Product Configurations.
The number of Affected Product Configurations decreased
approximately 80%, from 219, 767 to 42, 061 and the number
of links of both Affected Product Configurations and Vulnera-
bilities also decrased significantly.
2) Source Analysis: We next focus on each information
source.
Starting with Tactics, see Figure 3a, we find that all of the
Tactics are linked to at least 10 Techniques. Recall ATT&CK
is a matrix of Techniques, organized by a column per Tactic,
and a link implies that a Technique serves the tactical objective
named by the Tactic. The number of Techniques serving each
Tactic varies. Several Tactics are served by a number of
Techniques. However, the magnitude of the difference between
the Tactic with the least and most links is 62 (while the median
number of relational links is 22.5). The Tactic served by the
most Techniques is Defense Evasion which is linked to
72 Techniques.
Techniques can serve more than one Tactic, and we observe
that each of the 266 Techniques serves at least one Tactic
but very few serve multiple Tactics. The Technique Valid
Accounts serves two Tactics, and six Techniques each serve
three Tactics. We can inventory Technique and Attack Pattern
relationships. The relationship associates the means of an
attack, i.e. Techniques, to the attack itself. We find that 74%
of the Techniques are not associated with any Attack Pattern.
Each of the remaining Techniques, except for two, serve only
one Attack Pattern. The two exceptions are (1) the Supply
Chain Compromise which serves three Attack Patterns and
(2) Endpoint Denial of Service which serves four
Attack Patterns. From a Technique analysis, an overall lack
of relational information connecting the objectives of Tactics
and the means of Techniques with Attack Patterns becomes
apparent. We will next look at Attack Patterns to consider
their relations to Techniques and, further, inquire into the key
Attack Patterns, those that relationally unify Techniques and
Weaknesses.
Pivoting to Attack Patterns, we can recall that of the 519
Attack Patterns, 25% are Floating Entries. They are named
attacks with no indication of how they could be accomplished
or what weakness in a system they would exploit. We observe
that only 10% of Attack Patterns span both Techniques and
Weaknesses. Per Figure 3c, most Attack Patterns only have one
relational link and, at most, an Attack Pattern has 13. There
are 3 Attack Patterns with 13 relational links:
1) Using Leading ’Ghost’ Character
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3: Plots showing relational linkage statistics for (a) Tactics, (b) Techniques, and (c) Attack Patterns.
Sequences to Bypass Input Filters,
2) Manipulating Web Input to File System
Calls, and
3) Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding.
All 13 links of each of these Attack Patterns span from
Attack Pattern to Weakness. None of the links relate the
Attack Pattern to a Technique. The Attack Pattern Remote
Services with Stolen Credentials identifies the
most means of attack – 4 through its 4 Technique links. It
also links to one Weakness – CWE-522 Insufficiently
Protected Credentials.
One can think of an ideal Attack Pattern as a bridge. It
connects an attack to how it is executed and to where it is
targeted. At this point in time, BRON users could benefit
from more connected relational bridges. It is reasonable to
expect that future efforts will more completely enumerate
Attack Patterns to assure a more relationally informative set of
sources. However, given threat assessment technologies make
use of these sources, this inventory-based analysis reveals
possible blind spots.
Analyzing the number of links to and from each Weakness
entry, we observe a large comparative increase (orders of
magnitude) in the range, see Figure 4, versus the information
sources we have just analyzed. When, regardless of year,
relationships to and from each Weakness entry are counted,
the range is the highest for all information sources at 12, 291.
The facts that Vulnerabilities, to which Weaknesses connect,
have the greatest quantity of entries and that Weaknesses are
general abstract concepts which explains this ranking.
Around 45% of Weaknesses are targets identified by
Attack Patterns. Does this imply that there exist no at-
tacks targeting 55% of the Weaknesses? Or, is the record
lacking? The Weaknesses with large number of relations
are mostly connected to Vulnerabilities and are identified
as the targets of attacks. The Weakness Information
Exposure is a target of 57 Attack Patterns (the highest
number among Weaknesses) and it further details 6, 624 Vul-
nerabilities, i.e. more specific targets. The Weakness CWE-
79, Improper Neutralization of Input During
Web Page Generation, (Cross-Site Scripting)
connects to the most Vulnerabilities at 1, 292. Six Attack
Patterns identify this Weakness as a target. However, 44%
of these Vulnerabilities date before 2015. When we focus
only on Weaknesses from 2015-2020, the range of number
of Vulnerabilities decreases significantly but is still quite
substantial with several Super Entries. In the future, we can
look at parent-child connections within Weaknesses to better
understand the extent of comprehensive linking.
Moving to Vulnerabilities, most Vulnerabilities on average,
regardless of what years they were reported and how many
Affected Product Configuration versions are referenced, tend to
connect to 600 or fewer entries, either Weaknesses or Affected
Product Configurations. Figure 5 shows four combinations
of connections: all or recent Vulnerabilities, and all or latest
Affected Product Configurations. The distribution when all
Affected Product Configuration versions are referenced is right-
skewed with a long tail. The distribution when only the latest
version of Affected Product Configurations is used is also
right-skewed but has a shorter tail. As would be expected
when removing earlier versions of a software application from
consideration, many Vulnerability Floating Entries emerge and
the number of Super Entries decreases drastically. When we
filter down to only recent Vulnerabilities, while considering all
Affected Product Configuration entries, we observe an increase
in the number of Floating Entry Vulnerabilities but we see a
decrease when the number of Affected Product Configuration
entries decreases.
Severity scores are assigned by CVE Numbering Author-
ities (CNAs). All 10 members of this vendor set are CNAs.
Although CVSS is an industry-standard, the calculated severity
score within a vendor and among vendors is likely to vary.
Variance can depend on the interpretation and details within
vulnerability report. Additionally, analysts who calculate sever-
ity scores for vulnerabilities that do not contain sufficient
details and data assume a worst-case scenario and assign a
10 to Vulnerabilities with no information.2 As a result, some
vendors may have Vulnerabilities with higher severity scores
because of missing data.
The Vulnerability with the most connections, when all
versions of an Affected Product Configuration are considered,
is CVE-2016-1409. This describes a bug in Cisco IOS
2https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss
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Fig. 4: Relational linkage statistics for Weakness entries when
all Vulnerabilities and only more recent Vulnerabilities are
counted.
Fig. 5: Count of Vulnerability connections when all Vulner-
abilities or more recent Vulnerabilities are used, and when
all versions or only the latest version of Affected Product
Configurations are referenced.
that creates a vulnerability to Denial of Service attacks. It
has a severity score of 6.25 (on the CVSS scale of 0 to
10). However, the Vulnerability with the most connections
changes when only the latest version of any Affected Product
Configuration is considered. It is CVE-2020-0551 which
describes a vulnerability in an Intel product with a severity
score of 3.75.
In general, the large portion of floating Vulnerabilities
indicates a gap between the data informing its users of an
abstract vulnerability - i.e. what types or features of products
pose risk versus informing them of an operational vulnerability
that indicates specific products and versions that are affected
and indicates what may need to be patched or updated. In
addition, Figure 5 shows difference of which CVEs to select
Fig. 6: Count of Affected Product Configuration connections
when all Vulnerabilities or more recent Vulnerabilities are
considered, and when all versions or only the latest version
of a software product are counted.
and which versions to use for analysis. It verifies what we
expected regarding version “noise”. This can be useful when
considering versions of applications.
Affected Product Configuration connection statistics are
shown in Figure 6. The distribution when all versions are
referenced is right-skewed with a long tail. The distribution
when only the latest version of Affected Product Configurations
is referenced is right-skewed but has a shorter tail. The vendor
and product that has the most connections spanning Vulnerabil-
ities and its versions is Linux Version 8 from Debian. However,
when we only consider one version of a Affected Product
Configuration, the Affected Product Configuration with the
most connections is a Windows Server from 2012. The Debian
Linux 8 connections decrease because there are more recent
versions of Debian Linux. We see a similar pattern when
focusing on more recent Vulnerability data. Debian Linux 8
is the most commonly linked Affected Product Configuration
when all versions are considered, but a version of Windows
8 RT (which is discontinued) is the most commonly linked
when only the latest version of a product is considered. We
can observe how the tail of the connection distribution shrinks
as more recent data is in focus and multiple older versions are
filtered, see Figure 6.
We provide precise aggregate source and connective quan-
tities in Table II. We consider every version of a Affected
Product Configuration. The mean number of links from a
Tactic to a Technique is 28.4 (stdev 18.9), and the mean
number of Weakness links is 8.16 (stdev 46.70).
B. Vulnerability paths
We can also consider paths connecting through Vulnera-
bilities, dubbing them Vulnerability paths. Figure 7a shows
yearly trends of how many such paths start from, respectively,
a Tactic, an Attack Pattern, or a Weakness, and end at a
Vulnerability. It also shows how many Vulnerabilities are
6
TABLE II: BRON source and relational quantities for non-
Floating Entries. Median refers to the median number of
relations in or out of an entry. The rightmost column provides
the lowest and highest counts of entries’ relations with the
range in brackets.
Source Total Entries Median No. of Links Count Range
Tactic 12 22.5 10-72 (62)
Technique 266 1 1-4 (3)
Attack Pattern 519 1 1-13 (12)
Weakness 314 4 1-12,292 (12,291)
Vulnerability 144,594 1 1-4,891 (4,890)
Affected Prod Conf 219,767 1 1-2,573 (2,572)
not connected to a Weakness. Another interesting aspect of
Vulnerability entries is how their quantity has changed over
time. We examined this using Figure 7a. Over time, more
Vulnerabilities are reported. This may be due to more products
use and more bug reporting. When we filter down to only
recent Vulnerabilities, while considering all Affected Product
Configuration entries, we observe an increase in the number of
Floating Entry Vulnerabilities but we see a decrease when the
number of Affected Product Configuration entries decreases.
Figure 7b shows that the ratios of paths from Vulnerabilities
to other data types have been relatively stable since 2008.
C. BRON Severity Scores
Because of the large number of Floating Entries, espe-
cially Vulnerability Floating Entries, we define BRON’s “non-
demonstrated” severity as the sum of CVSS severity scores
assigned to Vulnerabilities which are not yet linked to any
Affected Product Configurations i.e. specific products and
versions. It contrasts with “operational” severity which is the
sum of severity scores assigned to Vulnerabilities which have
at least one Affected Product Configuration. We define total
severity as the sum of non-demonstrated and linked severity.
In general, Floating Entry Vulnerabilities tend to have low risk
severity scores (see Figure 9). This is regardless of whether
all or most recent Affected Product Configuration versions
are considered. The proportion of non-demonstrated severity
also changes over time, per Figure 8. Nearly 25% of non-
demonstrated Vulnerabilities have severity scores of 0. Recent
Vulnerabilities contribute more to non-demonstrated severity
than those of previous years. A possible explanation for this
could be that it takes time (in the scale of years) after a
Vulnerability is documented to identify a specific Affected
Product Configuration.
The number of Vulnerabilities with lower severity scores
increases over the years, and most of these Vulnerabilities are
not connected. For example, the percentage of Vulnerabilities
that are not connected to Weaknesses decreased drastically
from 87% in 2006 to 18% in 2008 as seen in Figure 7b, while
the number of severity scores of 0 for those Vulnerabilities has
increased between 2006 and 2008. This correlation between
the number of Floating Entry Vulnerabilities and the number
of low severity scores suggests that Vulnerabilities not linked
to Weaknesses tend to have lower severity scores. We observe
a similar situation in that Vulnerabilities not connected to
Affected Product Configurations tend to have lower severity
scores as seen in Figure 9. We observe a similar situation in
that Vulnerabilities not connected to Affected Product Config-
urations tend to have lower severity scores as seen in Figure 9.
The amount of Floating Entry severity was unexpected
when we tried to answer questions about where the severity
was, see Figure 9. The length of the tails for the different
public threat data types are very interesting. Does that imply
categorization error (should have more refined categories) or
that some analysts spend more effort finding and writing out
the vulnerabilities?
D. BRON’s Longest Paths
A central merit of BRON is that it unifies independent
sources to provide a seamless set of paths that connect them
to one another. To showcase this, we consider the longest
paths within BRON that run between Tactics and Affected
Product Configurations. A sample of these sets can be ex-
amined by querying BRON for all entries connected to the
Persistence Tactic (TA0003). This set is outlined in
Figure 10. One example path is from the Persistence
Tactic to the Google Chrome product.
The entries in this path are:
• Tactic (TA0003) Persistence: The adversary is
trying to maintain their foothold. Persistence consists of
techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems
across restarts, changed credentials, and other interrup-
tions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for
persistence include any access, action, or configuration
changes that let them maintain their foothold on systems,
such as replacing or hijacking legitimate code or adding
startup code.
• Technique: (T1574) Hijack Execution Flow,
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads
by hijacking the way operating systems run programs.
Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of
persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur
over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to
elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application
control or other restrictions on execution.
◦ Sub-Technique (T1574.010) Services File
Permissions Weakness. Adversaries may
execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the
binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws
in the permissions of Windows services to replace
the binary that is executed upon service start. These
service processes may automatically execute specific
binaries as part of their functionality or to perform
other actions. If the permissions on the file system
directory containing a target binary, or permissions
on the binary itself are improperly set, then the
target binary may be overwritten with another binary
using user-level permissions and executed by the
original process. If the original process and thread are
running under a higher permissions level, then the
replaced binary will also execute under higher-level
permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
• Attack Pattern CAPEC-17: Using Malicious
Files An attack of this type exploits a system’s
configuration that allows an attacker to either directly
access an executable file, for example through shell
access; or in a possible worst case allows an attacker
to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp
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(a) Number of Vulnerabilities reported by year. (b) Percentage of Vulnerabilities reported by year.
Fig. 7: Number and percentage of Vulnerabilities reported by year connected to a Tactic, Attack Pattern, or Weakness. Note 2020
has only ≈ 5 months of data. In general, the number and percentage of Vulnerabilities connected to each data type is increasing
over the years.
Fig. 8: Annual Total Severity and Non-demonstrated Severity.
Note 2020 has only ≈ 5 months of data.
servers, and message oriented middleware systems which
have many integration points are particularly vulnerable,
because both the programmers and the administrators
must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct
privileges for each interface.
• Weakness (CWE-264) Permissions,
Privileges, and Access Controls
• Vulnerability CVE-2011-1185
◦ Known Affected Hardware or Software Configuration
cpe:2.3:a:google:chrome:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*,
Up to (excluding) version 10.0.648.127.
◦ Vendor-Product: extracted as 3rd and 4th fields of
Known Affected Hardware or Software Configuration,
Fig. 9: Severity scores when referencing all Vulnerabilities
from 1999-2020 or only recent Vulnerabilities from 2015-
2020. Operational and non-demonstrated severity are shown.
obtaining Google Chrome.
A brief top-down narration of this path is: Given an
attack’s objective is Persistence, an attack Using
Malicious Files, by means of exploiting a Services
File Permissions Weakness Technique, could be
used to hijack execution flow and run a malicious binary
due to Permissions, Privileges, and Access
Controls weaknesses in all versions of Google Chrome
“before 10.0.648.127”. These “do not prevent (1) navigation
and (2) close operations on the top location of a sandboxed
frame”.
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Bottom-up, the narration of this path is: If any of a given
network’s computers are running Google Chrome versions
before 10.0.648.127, the administrators need to be on alert for
the browser being hijacked to execute a malicious payload that
can achieve persistence by exploiting services file permission
weaknesses that allow the attack to run at a higher permission
level where they can replace legitimate binaries with malicious
ones.
Tactic Persistence
Technique
File
System
Permissions
Weakness
Hypervisor
Attack Pattern
Using
Malicious
Files
Install
Rootkit
Weakness
Permission,
Privileges,
and Access
Controls
Improper
Access
Control
Vulnerability
CVE-
2011-
1185
CVE-
2010-
4624
Vendor-Product GoogleChrome
Cisco
iOS
Fig. 10: Subgraph of BRON showing some of the paths related
to the Tactic Persistence.
E. Example Queries
Given Persistence or any other Tactics, BRON can
be used to retrieve the related Techniques, Attack Patterns
connected to the Techniques, the Weaknesses connected to
the Attack Patterns, the Weaknesses connected to the Vul-
nerabilities, the Affected Product Configurations listed within
Vulnerabilities, and the Vendor and Product field in the Af-
fected Product Configuration entry formatting. This powerful
capability allows interesting queries to be posed of BRON by
coding in e.g. Python.
Some examples are shown in Table III. We start, in the
first row, by asking about the Affected Product Configurations
related to Persistence. Our query script retrieves 1, 352
Affected Product Configurations, one of which is a vulnera-
bility in the Oracle Argus Safety component of Oracle Health
Sciences Applications.
We next select Oracle’s product Argus Safety. It has a
vulnerability that allows an attacker with low privilege and
network access via HTTP to compromise Argus Safety. This
can impact additional products and result in unauthorized
update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Argus Safety
accessible data, as well as unauthorized read access to a subset
of Oracle Argus Safety accessible data [18]. In the second row,
we query BRON for the means of attacking this vulnerability.
BRON identifies 13 Techniques one of which is T1553.004
Install Root Certificate.
We then select Google Chrome and, in the third row,
ask BRON about the attack patterns it is involved in and
the tactics which an attack may be pursuing that target the
browser. We find out that five different tactics can target the
browser, one of which is Privilege Escalation. We
also find out that the browser is the vulnerability endpoint of
147 attack patterns, e.g. UDP Scan. Since Chrome has many
versions, we compare the same information in BRON about
two versions in the 4th and 5th rows to see the difference in
exposure. We choose a recent and older version. The older
version (5.0.375.0) serves the objective of 4 tactics, while the
more recent version (v52.0.2743.82), lists no tactics. The more
robust recent version also shows a reduction in attack patterns
to 12 from the older’s 120.
F. Vendors and Tactics
In Figure 11 we pursue the idea of isolating vendor
information within BRON. How many times is a vendor cited
in an Affected Product Configuration? While some vendors are
cited in a large number of Affected Product Configurations,
most vendors are cited in many fewer. Even when referencing
all versions of an Affected Product Configuration, the vast
majority of vendors have fewer than 1, 000. When only one
version of Affected Product Configurations is referenced, most
vendors have fewer than 250 Affected Product Configurations.
This difference shows that many vendors are represented by
multiple Affected Product Configurations of one product.
We decide next to focus upon a smaller set of vendors
whose products have significant market share and are likely,
therefore, to have significant representation in BRON. We
approximate market share by selecting the top 10 technology
vendors in the Fortune 500. Members of our “Top-10” are
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Dell, IBM, Intel, HP, Facebook,
Cisco and Oracle.
Depending on Tactic, how many exposures do the Top-10
vendors have? Figure 12 is a heat map that shows the number
of unique products for each vendor that are exposed to each
Tactic. For each Tactic, looking column-wise, the map provides
a count of how many different products of each vendor are
vulnerable to it. A row is provided for each vendor. Intel has
many more unique products that are vulnerable to Defense
Evasion and Discovery tactical objectives compared to
other Tactics or other vendors. For example, Intel has 1, 369
products exposed to Defense Evasion and 1, 084 products
exposed to Discovery, while it has 54 or fewer products
exposed to each of the other Tactics. In general, more prod-
ucts are exposed to Discovery, Defense Evasion,
Persistence, and Privilege Escalation than the
other Tactics. Scanning across rows, for each vendor, we
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TABLE III: Example queries illustrating some ways BRON can be used. (Note that only a subset of the threat data results are
shown for each query.)
Query Results (Abbreviated) Number of Results
Affected Product Configurations affected by Tactic of Persistence Affected Product Configurations: Oracle hospitality, . . . Affected Product Configu-
rations: 1,352
Techniques connected to CVE-2019-2432 (vulnerability in Oracle health
sciences application)
Techniques: Install Root Certificate, . . . Techniques: 13
Tactics and Attack Patterns for Google Chrome (all
versions)
Tactics: privilege-escalation, . . . Tactics: 5
Attack Patterns: UDP Scan, . . . Attack Patterns: 147
Tactics and Attack Patterns for Google Chrome (version
5.0.375.0)
Tactics: privilege-escalation, . . . Tactics: 4
Attack Patterns: Buffer Overflow via Environmental Variables, . . . Attack Patterns: 120
Tactics and Attack Patterns for Google Chrome (version
52.0.2743.82)
Tactics: NONE Tactics: 0
Attack Patterns: Overflow Binary Resource File, . . . Attack Patterns: 12
Fig. 11: Number of Affected Product Configurations for dif-
ferent vendors when all versions of Affected Product Config-
urations and when only the latest version of Affected Product
Configurations is referenced.
can observe how many different products are vulnerable to
different Tactics. Many vendors have higher vulnerability to
Persistence, Privilege Escalation and Defense
Evasion. Oracle stands out with a significantly higher num-
ber of products vulnerable to Lateral Movement. This
may be due to more documentation or to actual greater
vulnerability. The connection analysis can help identify areas
that have a lot of data, and which have little, e.g. as in
Figure 12.
G. Vendors and Severity Scores
We next consider the severity of Vulnerabilities of this set
of vendors. Figure 13a shows the distribution of severity scores
of vendor products across all Tactics, collecting the maximum
Vulnerability severity score of all versions. The distributions
across vendors are significantly different. Some vendors such
as Google have more Affected Product Configurations with
severity scores around 7 and 10. In contrast, the distribution
for Intel shows three main peaks with severity scores between 3
and 7, which indicates that Intel tends to have Affected Product
Configurations with low and medium severity.
We noted significantly larger counts of products exposed
to the Tactics of Discovery and Defense Evasion. In
Fig. 12: Heat map showing number of unique products by
vendor that are exposed to nine Tactics. Three Tactics are not
shown because they did not expose any of these vendors. Most
counts are between [0, 250], but there are a few instances where
a vendor has more than 500 unique products vulnerable to a
Tactic.
Figure 13b we compare the corresponding distributions of
severity scores. We see that severity is distributed somewhat
the same (see symmetry in the violin plot along the vertical-
axis) for Apple, Google, Dell and Oracle but we see differences
for the other vendors. The question of what products specifi-
cally fall prey to these tactics and their specific severity score
distributions is a topic of future work.
The severity score distribution for Affected Product Con-
figurations connected to specific Tactics is sometimes differ-
ent than severity score distribution for all Affected Product
Configurations of a vendor. For example, the severity score
distribution for Intel’s Known Affected Hardware or Software
Configurations connected to the Tactic of Discovery re-
mains similar to its distribution when connected to all Known
Affected Hardware or Software Configurations. However, the
severity scores for Intel’s Known Affected Hardware or Soft-
ware Configurations connected to the Tactic of Defense
Evasion is mostly near a score of 4.
For each vendor, we count the number of entries per source
affecting them, given there are paths in BRON from Attack
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(a) Distributions of severity scores for Affected Product Configura-
tions connected to all Tactics.
(b) Distributions of severity scores for Affected Product Configu-
rations connected to two specific tactics: Discovery (blue) and
Defense Evasion (brown).
Fig. 13: Distributions of severity scores, Top-10 vendors.
Patterns up to Techniques. Figure 14 shows this data when all
Vulnerabilities and all versions of Affected Product Configu-
rations are referenced. Some vendors such as Cisco and Intel
have a high Affected Product Configurations to Vulnerability
ratio, while others such as Apple have a high Vulnerability to
Affected Product Configurations ratio. Dell and Facebook look
similar while the other vendors have similar relative Attack
Patterns, Vulnerabilities and Affected Product Configurations.
For Tactics and Techniques, Facebook has fewer entries while
the other nine are roughly equal. There is also a very similar
count of Attack Patterns across all vendors within BRON.
We also check the number of Affected Product Configura-
tions a particular vendor incurs over time (no figure shown).
It is not distributed equally across years. Vendors, like Google
and HP, appear to have very few Affected Product Configura-
tions before 2015. This raises a warning about making sure
cross-vendor comparisons are on similar bases. Referencing
data at the same date, after the same number of versions, at
the start or end of a release version would help with this.
We next select one O/S product, Oracle Linux, and inquire
into the importance of its versions within Affected Product
Configurations. The number of entries per source for Oracle
Fig. 14: Number of entries per source for Top-10 vendors.
Fig. 15: Number of unique threat data types for Oracle Linux
versions. X-axis is version number, Y-axis is number of threat
data types, color indicates threat data type.
Linux versions is shown in Figure 15. Over the versions (and
time), the number of unique Vulnerabilities for each version is
increasing. The number of Tactics, Techniques, Attack Patterns,
and Weaknesses increases between version 4 and 5 and then
remains similar between version 5 and 7. Versions 5, 6, and 7
each has the same 5 Tactics and 27 Techniques. Not all prod-
ucts have monotonically increasing exposure to the different
data types. In future work, this inquiry can be expanded to
other products and looking into how much these increases are
due to attack techniques increasing or larger and more feature-
laden software introducing more vulnerabilities.
H. Vendors and their browsers
On a new tact, we consider data for a specific product
category. Here, we choose web browsers. We form a set of
5: Apple Safari, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft
Edge and Explorer. We note that Edge is a Chromium based
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Fig. 16: Distribution of severity scores for vendor browsers
using all Vulnerabilities linked to all Affected Product Config-
uration versions.
Fig. 17: Number of unique data types for vendor browsers
using all Affected Product Configuration versions.
browser that is developed most recently, with security in mind.
The distributions of severity scores for all versions of these
browsers are shown in Figure 16. These violins can be cross-
referenced to the number of entries per source per Figure 17.
All browsers are identifiable in the same rough number of
Tactics, Techniques, and Attack Patterns. We observe Edge has
significantly fewer Affected Product Configurations over all
versions than any other browser, but relatively similar counts
of entries in others sources as compared to Explorer, another
Microsoft browser. Figure 18 shows how many tactics the
browser products are exposed to for all the product versions.
Because browser versioning could impact the results, fture
work could examine data for the most recent release of each
browser. This could afford a sense of whether Microsoft Edge
is prone to fewer and less severe attacks and exposes fewer
Vulnerabilities.
Fig. 18: Heatmap showing number of product versions by
vendor product that are exposed to nine Tactics. Three Tactics
are not shown because they did not expose any of these vendor
products. Some product versions are exposed to multiple
Tactics.
IV. RELATED SOURCES
The sources of BRON are variously described as industry
standard of common names (CVE), a list (CVE and CWE),
an encyclopedia (CWE), comprehensive dictionary and classi-
fication taxonomy (CAPEC) and knowledge base (ATT&CK).
They have multiple counterparts, also with a variety of de-
scriptors. Among them, but not exclusively are MISP [26],
CTI [6], OVM [27], FireEye OpenIOC [2], STIX [20], IDS
rules [21], OpenC2 [15], UCO [25], VERIS [4], and IODEF
[1]. We chose BRON’s sources for their composite information
value and their popularity. Collectively they also aim to support
cyber-hunting or active cyber security research, so users can
proactively impede and attribute attackers by looking at their
potential objectives, techniques and targets.
Similar threat and vulnerability data within knowledge
graphs and ontologies exist. For example, the STUCCO on-
tology and knowledge graph incorporates information from
13 structured data sources and provides relationships among
15 entity types including software, vulnerabilities, and attacks
[3]. The SEPSES knowledge graph links information from
standard data sources including CVEs, CAPECs, CWEs, CPEs,
and CVSS for vulnerability scoring [5]. SEPSES provides use
cases for vulnerability assessment and intrusion detection with
sample queries. SEPSES uses some of BRON’s sources but
BRON is unique, to our knowledge, in incorporating the tactics
and techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK matrix and bridging
them to CWE via CAPEC. This allows BRON to support a
broader set of analyses and inform users of the extent of the
data. This same claim holds for www.cvedetails.com which
provides an easy to use web interface to CVE vulnerability data
only. It supports browsing and statistics for vendors, products
and versions and viewing Vulnerabilities related to them but it
doesn’t source CVE, CAPEC, and ATT&CK entries.
Threat modeling models the software system, potential
attacker goals and techniques, and potential threats to the
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system so that cyber defenders can identify and mitigate
vulnerable assets. There are several threat modeling methods
that vary in comprehensiveness, abstraction, and focus. These
methods include but are not limited to STRIDE, PASTA,
LINDDUN, and Attack Trees [22]. BRON uses a single graph
to relationally connect entries from sources ranging from attack
objectives to vulnerable software. It is possible that in the
future such a consolidated graph plus queries and paths of
BRON could support threat modeling.
V. DISCUSSION
The idea behind BRON is succinct but powerful: provide a
conveniently connected graph of multiple public sources in the
domain of cyber security that are already connected but chal-
lenging to traverse coherently. We believe that: 1) threat an-
alysts (attending to immediate tactical and operational threats
in the Security Operation Center), 2) system administrators
(who are in charge of a cyber system), 3) cyber risk annotators
(who tally the risk of discovered vulnerabilities) and 4) cyber
risk analysts (who gauge strategic threats to an organization)
may find BRON useful in their work. More generally, BRON
provides context that could improve the comprehensibility and
analysis of cyber threat intelligence. BRON can function as
a coherent, more accessible resource for potential consumers
who are interested in these sources.
Our analyses reveal inherent information complexity aris-
ing from historical record keeping, changes wrought by time,
and the human role in populating the sources and assigning
scores such as severity. They serve current consumers of
the sources and future consumers, particularly those in the
machine learning community, who seek statistical information
about the data they train and use for modeling.
To summarize, BRON supports quantitative cataloging of
the composite set of sources. For example, we showed the
number of connected and Floating Entry entries of each source.
It also supports trend analyses. We showed annual numbers
of connected Vulnerabilities and tracked the distribution of
CVSS scores over the years. These approximate inventories
also indicate the extent to which a complete narrative of known
threat tactics and techniques – the why and how of attacks,
and their relation to known attacks and what they target,
in terms of weaknesses, vulnerabilities and Affected Product
Configurations is forthcoming. In this respect, the data must
be exploited while also treated as a set of works in progress.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Our analyses are preliminary and explorative, providing
broad and shallow view of BRON’s data. They are intended
to indicate the direction of future, more elaborate comparisons
and the promise of highly informative investigations through
longer, more thorough, deeper studies. We have focused on
showcasing BRON’s potential. In addition, with an academic
lens, we pursued inventory and statistics. Even more statistics
could be further extracted, e.g. statistics for different sets of
vendors. Or, paths over explicit intervals of time, different
groups of similar products, and information related to specific
sources or paths within BRON could be extracted.
In additional future work, more effort must be taken
to align comparisons along a date or age of product. Our
existing analysis could also be used to diminish the gaps
between abstract goals and the concrete software and hardware
vulnerabilities that are needed to be well-informed when
considering a network’s security. BRON can also potentially
support threat modeling and network vulnerability analysis of
existing networks.
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